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O
ver the past several decades, the scope, reach, and 
cost of federal regulations have increased dramati-
cally. As the federal regulatory state has grown, leg-
islative control over regulatory policy has declined. 
Long after authorizing legislation is adopted, agencies continue 
to adopt regulations and implement policies with relatively little 
legislative input or oversight. At the same time, presidential 
administrations of both parties have used administrative regula-
tions to implement policies and programs that Congress failed to 
approve. As legislative control over regulatory policy has waned, 
so too has congressional accountability for the regulation.
In the past two years, several members of Congress have 
proposed measures to reassert legislative control and enhance 
congressional accountability for regulatory policy. The so-called 
Regulations of the Executive in Need of Scrutiny (REINS) Act 
would prevent federal agencies from implementing major regula-
tory initiatives without congressional approval. This legislation 
has the support of the House Republican leadership and was 
incorporated into the GOP’s 2010 “Pledge to America” as part of 
a “plan to rein in the red tape factory in Washington, D.C.”
REINS Act supporters hail the legislation as a needed check 
on federal regulatory agencies. Opponents criticize it as a poten-
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Congress makes another effort to regain control of regulation.
By Jonathan h. adleR | Case Western Reserve University School of Law
tially unconstitutional attack on federal regulations that could 
undermine health, safety, and environmental protections. Market-
oriented groups and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce believe the act 
contains necessary reforms. The Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, on the other hand, calls the REINS Act a “radical” and “peril-
ous” proposal that would hamstring needed regulatory initiatives. 
According to the NRDC’s David Goldston, “it is hard to imagine 
a more far-reaching, fundamental, and damaging shift in the way 
the government goes about its business of safeguarding the public.”
The REINS Act’s most ardent supporters and defenders 
assume that the act would stem the flow of federal regulation 
from the nation’s capital, but is this so? A more measured look at 
the act suggests that it could enhance regulatory accountability 
and popular input on major regulatory proposals. Less clear is 
whether the legislation would prove to be much of an obstacle 
to additional regulatory initiatives or reforms. The REINS Act 
would, however, retard the continuing accretion of executive 
authority over domestic affairs.
Regulatory Growth
From the 1950s through the 2000s, the amount of federal 
regulatory activity, as measured by pages in the Federal Register, 
has increased more than six-fold. In the 1950s, federal agencies 
published an average of just under 11,000 pages in the Federal 
Register per year. By contrast, over the past decade federal agen-
cies averaged over 70,000 pages per year. In 2010, the Federal 
Register contained well over 80,000 pages. Over one-quarter of 
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those pages were devoted to final agency regulations.
The number of new final rules each year has declined from its 
1970s peaks, but federal regulations are still adopted at a rapid 
pace. Federal agencies have finalized over 3,500 regulations per 
year in each of the last three years. Those rules cover everything 
from greenhouse gas emission reporting and proxy disclosures to 
electronic fund transfers and the energy and water use of home 
appliances. Substantially more regulation is on the way. The 2010 
Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions 
lists over 4,000 additional regulations in various stages of the reg-
ulatory pipeline. By some estimates, the Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (better known as “Dodd-Frank”) will 
require over 200 federal rulemakings and the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act will require dozens upon dozens more.
The growth of federal regulation has imposed significant 
costs on American business and consumers. According to some 
estimates, the aggregate costs of federal regulations could exceed 
$1.5 trillion per year — substantially more than the total amount 
collected from individual income taxes annually. Regulations 
provide benefits as well, and many regulations may provide 
greater benefits than costs. But this does not make their costs 
irrelevant. Just like taxes, regulations may be necessary to address 
public ills or to provide important public benefits, but those 
benefits come at a cost nonetheless. The fact that regulations, like 
taxes, can both impose substantial costs and generate substantial 
benefits makes it that much more important that there be politi-
cal accountability for federal regulatory decisions.
Delegation
The dramatic increase in the scope of federal regulation has been 
facilitated by the practice of delegating substantial amounts of 
regulatory authority and policy discretion to federal regulatory 
agencies. Federal regulatory agencies have no inherent powers. 
Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution vests all legislative power 
in the Congress. Federal agencies only have the power to adopt 
rules governing private conduct if such power has been delegated 
to them through a valid statutory enactment. 
Over the course of the 20th century, Congress has delegated 
ever greater amounts of regulatory authority to an ever-expanding 
array of federal agencies. Congress has often had good reasons for 
doing this. The economic, environmental, and other problems 
Congress sought to address were complicated and often necessi-
tated careful study and analysis. Delegation of regulatory authority 
to expert agencies with the time and expertise to focus on specific 
problems was a way to ensure that federal regulations were adopted 
to address the nuances and particulars of specific problems. 
Delegation may have been expedient or even necessary, but 
it has also had a cost. The delegation of broad and far-reaching 
regulatory authority has undermined political accountability 
for regulatory decisions and has allowed for regulatory agencies 
to adopt policies that did not always align with congressional 
intent or contemporary priorities. When Congress delegates 
broad regulatory authority to executive or independent agencies, 
it inevitably loses some degree of control over how that authority 
is exercised. If a federal agency is instructed to adopt measures 
that serve the public interest or control a given environmental 
problem as far as is practicable, the federal agency retains sub-
stantial discretion to determine what sorts of measures should 
be adopted and at what cost. 
Judicial review helps ensure that agencies play by the rules set 
out by Congress — that agencies provide adequate notice and 
opportunity for public participation, provide sufficient explana-
tions for the rules they adopt, observe the limits of their regula-
tory jurisdiction, and so on. Yet judicial review does not delve into 
the policy choices that agencies make — nor should it. Whether a 
given agency is following the best course is ultimately a decision 
for the political branches.
In principle, the non-delegation doctrine ensures that Con-
gress remains responsible for the major policy judgments that 
drive regulatory decisions. In practice, however, the doctrine 
does not impose significant constraints on the delegation of 
rulemaking power. Under existing precedent, Congress need 
only provide federal agencies with an “intelligible principle” 
to guide regulatory initiatives. It does not take much to sat-
isfy that standard; any broad statement of policy will do. The 
Supreme Court has found an “intelligible principle” in statutes 
authorizing federal agencies to set “generally fair and equitable” 
prices or to regulate in “the public interest.” As Justice Antonin 
Scalia summarized, the Court has “almost never felt qualified 
to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of 
policy judgment that can be left to those executing or applying 
the law.” As a consequence, federal agencies are left with tremen-
dous amounts of discretion in how they exercise their regulatory 
power, including whether to exercise such power at all and even 
when, if ever, to change their mind. A statute’s “intelligible prin-
ciple” need not even dictate a policy direction. Under existing 
doctrine, agencies are free to reverse course and overturn prior 
policies without any meaningful input from Congress.
Old Statutes, New Regulations
The difficulty of ensuring that agencies remain accountable for 
their policy choices is magnified by time. Agencies today con-
tinue to exercise authority granted decades ago. To take a current 
example, the Environmental Protection Agency is in the midst 
of implementing a series of regulations governing the emission 
of greenhouse gases from mobile and stationary sources. These 
regulations are intended to address an important environmental 
concern and will have a tremendous impact on the American 
economy as they threaten to affect literally hundreds of thou-
sands of facilities across the nation. The EPA’s authority for these 
regulations is a statute passed by Congress, the Clean Air Act, 
that the Supreme Court interpreted as authorizing the regula-
tion of greenhouse gases. Yet there is no indication that the cur-
rent or recently concluded Congresses support the EPA’s actions. 
The Clean Air Act’s basic architecture was enacted in 1970. Key 
provisions were added in 1977 and 1990, and the act has not been 
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amended to any significant degree in over 20 years. According to 
the EPA, these decades-olds provisions authorize (if not compel) 
it to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from cars and trucks, 
utilities, factories, and other sources. According to the EPA, the 
legislative grant of authority it received decades ago drives its 
decisions today, even though Congress was not at all focused on 
global warming when the relevant provisions of the Clean Air Act 
were adopted, relatively few members of Congress who voted for 
the Clean Air Act remain in Congress today, and Congress has 
never taken any action to affirmatively approve such regulation 
in the years since the act was adopted or amended.
Although the EPA is exercising authority ostensibly delegated 
by Congress, Congress is not politically accountable for the 
EPA’s actions. Members of both parties decry the EPA’s policies, 
arguing they are too lenient or strict, as if the decision whether 
to regulate greenhouse gases were the agency’s and the agency’s 
alone. Further, insofar as some maintain that the EPA’s actions 
are based upon a misreading of congressional intent, it is dif-
ficult for Congress to correct the agency’s course without going 
through the lengthy and time-consuming process of amending 
statutes that are on the books. In the meantime, the EPA has 
taken it upon itself to amend the Clean Air Act’s numerical emis-
sion thresholds that trigger stationary source permitting require-
ments so as to ensure a “common sense” approach to emissions 
control that Congress never conceived, let alone adopted.
The above is hardly an isolated example. Numerous federal 
agencies continue to exercise substantial regulatory authority 
under old and often outdated statutes. Though the statutes 
were passed by Congress, and Congress is ultimately responsible 
for the power the agencies wield, Congress is not particularly 
accountable for how agencies today exercise power granted years 
ago. Agency authority, once granted, is difficult to modify or 
repeal. Drafting and adopting new legislation to revise existing 
agency authority is a laborious process not well suited to active 
agency oversight and control. 
Past Efforts at Legislative Control 
In the mid-20th century, Congress attempted to control 
administrative agency decision-making through the adop-
tion of legislative veto provisions. Between the 1930s and early 
1980s, Congress enacted legislative veto provisions into nearly 
300 statutes. These provisions enabled Congress to delegate 
broad legislative-like authority to administrative agencies while 
retaining the unilateral authority to overturn administrative 
decisions through legislative action, but without presidential 
assent or a veto-proof majority. 
A typical legislative veto provision was contained in the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act, which authorized either house of 
Congress to invalidate a decision by the U.S. attorney general 
to allow an otherwise deportable alien to remain in the United 
States. By allowing either house to override an agency decision, 
the legislative veto provisions effectively required concurrent 
agreement by the president and both houses of Congress before 
an agency decision could take effect, for dissent by either the Sen-
ate or the House of Representatives was enough to veto the action. 
Such provisions were popular, but they were not long-lived.
In 1983, the Supreme Court invalidated unicameral legisla-
tive vetoes in Immigration and 
Nationalization Service v. Chadha. 
The Court held that it was 
unconstitutional for a single 
house of Congress to overturn 
an administrative action taken 
pursuant to a valid grant of leg-
islative authority. Overturning 
an administrative action was, 
in effect, a legislative act. Under 
Article I of the Constitution, 
legislative acts require bicameralism and presentment — the 
concurrence of both houses of Congress and presentation before 
the president for his signature or veto, the latter of which could 
be overturned by super-majorities in both legislative chambers. 
Since INS v. Chadha, Congress has adopted various reforms 
aimed at restoring political accountability, disciplining federal 
agencies, and ensuring that federal regulatory policy is responsive 
to contemporary legislative priorities, all without sacrificing the 
practical benefits of delegation. While well-intentioned, these 
efforts have been largely unsuccessful.
The most recent effort to impose greater legislative control on 
regulatory policy was the Congressional Review Act of 1996. The 
CRA created an expedited process for consideration of joint reso-
lutions to overturn regulations of which Congress disapproved. 
In effect, the CRA created a framework for Congress to enact new 
laws to overturn or correct administrative implementation of 
previously enacted laws. 
The CRA created a mechanism whereby Congress could, at 
its own initiative, act to overturn administrative action. Yet the 
CRA has not been particularly effective — and this should not sur-
prise. There is tremendous inertia within the legislative process, 
and if Congress is required to take the initiative to overturn an 
unjustified or excessive regulation, it is unlikely to happen. Other 
priorities compete for legislators’ time and attention, and mem-
bers of Congress are not always eager to cast a vote for or against 
a controversial or high-profile regulation. As a consequence, the 
CRA has only been used once, to overturn the ergonomics rule 
adopted by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
Though the statutes were passed by Congress, 
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during the Clinton administration, and it is not widely consid-
ered to have disciplined agency action or increased congressional 
accountability for regulatory initiatives.
One particular problem is that the CRA effectively requires a 
super-majority in Congress to overturn an administrative action. 
This is because a president is likely to veto any legislative effort 
to overturn a regulation issued by his own administration. As a 
consequence, only those rules adopted near the end of a presi-
dent’s term are vulnerable to CRA repeal, and the executive can 
reduce that vulnerability by ensuring new rules are not issued 
at the tail end of a presidential term. During the last year of the 
Bush administration, for example, agencies were put on notice 
that they needed to finalize new regulations early enough so that 
they would not be subject to repeal under the CRA.
The REINS Act
The REINS Act seeks to discipline federal regulatory agencies 
and enhance congressional accountability for federal regula-
tions without replicating the problems of prior reform efforts 
or sacrificing the benefits of 
agency expertise and special-
ization. The legislation’s cen-
tral provision provides that 
new major rules cannot take 
effect unless Congress passes 
a joint resolution approving 
the regulation within 90 ses-
sion or legislative days of the 
rule’s submission to Congress. 
“Major rules” are defined as 
those regulations that are anticipated by the White House 
Office of Management and Budget to impose annual economic 
costs in excess of $100 million or otherwise have significant eco-
nomic or anticompetitive effects. Joint resolutions of approval, 
once passed by both houses of Congress, are then forwarded to 
the president for his signature (or veto). 
A key feature of the REINS Act is that it creates an expedited 
procedure to ensure prompt consideration of resolutions of 
approval in each house of Congress. First, it provides that such 
resolutions are automatically introduced into each house once a 
major rule is finalized by the agency. Second, legislative committees 
have a limited time to consider the resolution. Unlike with legisla-
tion, the failure of a committee to act does not kill the resolution; 
rather, after 15 session days, the resolution is automatically dis-
charged whether the committee has acted or not. Third, the REINS 
Act provides that resolutions of approval are privileged, not subject 
to amendment, and not subject to dilatory procedural motions. 
Debate is limited in each house and a resolution may not be fili-
bustered in the Senate. As introduced in the 112th Congress, the 
REINS Act is drafted so as to ensure that a resolution of approval is 
voted up or down in the committee of the whole within 70 session 
days of when an agency finalizes a major rule.
These provisions effectively disable the traditional means that 
legislators and special interest groups use to slow or stop legisla-
tive proposals. Whereas traditional legislation can be bottled up 
in committee or held up by a determined handful of legislators, 
resolutions of approval under the REINS Act cannot be disposed 
of without a majority vote. This requires an additional step before 
new major rules can become effective, but it also requires mem-
bers of Congress to openly declare their support or opposition 
for a specific rule.
While federal agencies promulgate over 3,000 new regulations 
each year, only a small percentage of these constitute “major” 
rules. From 1998 to 2007, federal agencies promulgated between 
50 and 80 major rules per year. By comparison, a new president 
will nominate a few hundred people to positions that require Sen-
ate confirmation in just the first year of an administration. Most 
such nominees go through with minimal delay — and without 
obstructing or compromising other legislative business. In the 
case of confirmations, Senate rules and traditions provide many 
ways for a small minority to gum up the works. A single senator 
can place a hold on a controversial or undesirable nominee. No 
such means of obstruction are available under the REINS Act, 
however, so there is no way for special interests to secretly stall a 
resolution of approval. 
In effect, the REINS Act amends preexisting regulatory stat-
utes to remove federal agency authority to unilaterally adopt 
regulatory measures, instead requiring agencies to forward 
“final” rules as proposals for congressional review. Requiring 
congressional approval before economically significant rules may 
take effect ensures that Congress takes responsibility for major 
regulatory policy decisions. Adopting an expedited legislative 
process, much like that which has been used for fast-track trade 
authority or base closings, enhances transparency and prevents a 
congressional review requirement from unduly delaying needed 
regulatory initiatives.
Criticism | In a recent article in The New Republic critical of the 
REINS Act, Univeristy of Richmond law professor Noah Sachs 
posed the following hypothetical:
Imagine if the board of a Fortune 500 company required 
the company’s vice presidents to obtain board approval before 
implementing any decision. Now imagine that the board is highly 
polarized and its members are at each other’s throats. A recipe for 
corporate gridlock, right?
If Professor Sachs’ hypothetical were analogous to what the 
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REINS Act proposes, it would be a devastating critique — but it 
is not. Imagine instead if the board of a Fortune 500 company 
required the company’s vice presidents to obtain board approval 
before implementing the two or three percent of decisions that 
are most important and potentially costly. This would not sur-
prise, nor produce “gridlock.” Rather, it is what we would expect 
from a responsible board — and it is all that the REINS Act would 
do. The approval requirement only applies to “major rules,” 
which are those rules expected to cost over $100 million annu-
ally and represent less than five percent of the federal regulations 
promulgated in any given year. Asking Congress to take respon-
sibility for this portion of federal rulemaking is not unreasonable, 
nor is it a major imposition.
Overcoming Chadha
An obvious question for REINS Act supporters is how can 
the congressional approval requirement be constitutional if 
a unicameral legislative veto, such as that considered in INS v. 
Chadha, is not. After all, in either case an agency determination 
is effectively vetoed if a majority of either house disapproves. 
The legislative veto in Chadha enabled either house to block an 
agency ruling by its own initiative. Under the REINS Act, both 
houses must vote in the affirmative for a major rule to take 
effect. For practical purposes, each requires bicameral consent 
for the agency decision to stand. For constitutional purposes, 
however, the formal difference is significant.
As then-Judge Stephen Breyer explained in a 1984 lecture, a 
congressional authorization requirement could replicate the 
function of the legislative veto invalidated in Chadha without the 
veto’s constitutional infirmity. By observing the formal require-
ments for legislation in Article I, he explained, congressional 
oversight of agency activity could be maintained without violat-
ing constitutional principles of separation of powers. In addition, 
unlike the legislative veto, requiring congressional approval for 
the adoption of new regulatory initiatives “imposes on Congress 
a degree of visible responsibility” for new regulatory initiatives. 
Harvard Law School’s Laurence Tribe likewise concluded at the 
time that such a requirement would be constitutional, even if he 
also thought it would be a bad idea.
The presentment clause in Article I, Section 7 of the Constitu-
tion provides that, for a bill to become law, it must be passed by a 
majority in both the House and Senate and signed into law by the 
president or, if vetoed by the president, re-passed by two-thirds 
majorities in each house. It further provides that “Every Order, 
Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and 
House of Representatives may be necessary … shall be presented to 
the President of the United States” for his signature or veto. The 
REINS Act complies with this requirement. Just like any other bill, 
a joint resolution requires the approval of both houses of Congress 
and is presented to the president. 
In some respects the REINS Act is more limited than the 
unicameral legislative vetoes at issue in Chadha or the congres-
sional approval requirement considered by Breyer, as the REINS 
Act would only require congressional approval for so-called 
“major rules.” The unicameral legislative veto often operated as 
a replacement for targeted “private bills” affecting the interests 
of a few. By contrast, those regulations subject to the REINS Act 
would, by definition, be only those that have broader impacts on 
large segments of the country, if not the nation as a whole. Only 
those rules deemed to be “economically significant” are covered, 
and such rules are a small, but important, portion of federal 
regulatory activity. 
Restraining Executive Authority?
Some members of Congress, such as Rep. John Conyers (D, 
Mich.), have expressed the concern that the REINS Act unduly 
interferes with executive authority. Sally Katzen, former direc-
tor of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the 
Clinton administration, citing Morrison v. Olson, has argued that 
“a statute is suspect if it ‘involves an attempt by Congress to 
increase its own powers at the expense of the executive branch.’” 
It is reasonable to see the REINS Act as an effort to constrain 
the executive — just look at the bill’s full title and findings. The 
problem with these arguments is that they ignore the distinction 
between executive and legislative functions.
The power to “enforce” the laws — that is, the power to take 
action to see that legal rules are complied with — is distinct from 
the power to make the rules pursuant to a delegation of author-
ity from Congress. So, for instance, the EPA’s power to impose 
fines or other sanctions on companies that violate emission 
limitations is distinct from the EPA’s power to set the emission 
limits. A requirement that federal regulatory agencies obtain con-
gressional approval before major rules may take effect requires 
congressional assent for the latter, but has no effect on the former.
The powers to investigate and prosecute are core executive func-
tions. Any effort by Congress to limit such powers and aggrandize 
its own is problematic. This point was made not only in Morrison 
(in which the Court upheld the statute in question, despite its 
intrusion on executive power), but in other cases as well. The execu-
tive power is distinct from the power to adopt legislative-type rules, 
however. The latter is not a core executive function. Rather it is 
a quasi-legislative power that must be delegated by Congress. As 
the Supreme Court has noted repeatedly, “It is axiomatic that an 
administrative agency’s power to promulgate legislative regulation 
is limited to the authority delegated by Congress.” 
Federal agencies have no authority to promulgate regula-
tions beyond that which has been given by Congress — and what 
Congress has given, it may take back. Restraining the exercise 
of such authority, whether by adopting rules for the exercise of 
regulatory authority (as under the Administrative Procedure Act 
or the Congressional Review Act) or limiting the scope of such 
authority, is perfectly acceptable so long as other constitutional 
requirements (such as bicameralism and presentment) are satis-
fied. As the REINS Act satisfies such requirements, there is no 
problem. The REINS Act does not curtail executive power so 
much as it places limits on the legislative-like power delegated to 
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the executive branch by Congress. While the REINS Act would 
reduce the discretion of executive and independent agencies to 
adopt far-reaching regulatory measures, it would not interfere 
with executive oversight of rulemaking and regulatory policy. 
A more serious constitutional question about the REINS Act is 
whether a statute may impose binding legislative process rules on 
either house of Congress. Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution 
provides that “Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceed-
ings.” According to some scholars, this means that each house has 
exclusive, unilateral control over its own rules, and that it would 
be unconstitutional to preempt such authority with a statute 
subject to presentment to the executive. If so, this would mean 
that a subsequent House or Senate could unilaterally repeal the 
procedural rules the REINS Act creates for expedited consideration 
of resolutions of approval. Yet such concerns have not stopped 
Congress from enacting numerous other statutes creating special 
procedural rules for special types of legislation, including fast-track 
trade authority and base closing decisions, and Congress appears 
to have stuck to the terms of such deals. There is a well-established 
practice of legislative compliance with statutorily enacted rules. 
Toward Greater Congressional Accountability
The REINS Act provides a means of curbing excessive or unwar-
ranted regulation, but it is not an obstacle to needed regulatory 
measures supported by the public. If agencies are generally 
discharging their obligations in a sensible manner, REINS Act–
type controls will have little effect. Indeed, even if federal regu-
latory agencies are overzealous, the REINS Act may not curtail 
federal regulation all that much. The legislation would apply 
only to new major rules, so existing regulations would remain 
untouched, and it would constrain regulatory and deregulatory 
initiatives alike. Perhaps more significantly, it is not clear that 
members of Congress would be so quick to condemn regula-
tory proposals once they know they will be required to back up 
their criticisms with an on-the-record vote. 
It is easy to claim the EPA has adopted an overly expensive rule, 
but may be more difficult to vote against pollution controls if it 
means a legislator has to take responsibility for a lack of federal 
action. As New York University law professor David Schoenbrod 
has argued, administrative delegation has often resulted in less 
environmental protection than there would have been had 
Congress been required to take responsibility for federal policy. 
Based on his experience as a litigator for the NRDC, Schoenbrod 
believes lead would have been phased out of gasoline much ear-
lier were it not for Congress’s ability to punt. Corporate interests 
have far more influence on agency rulemakings than open votes 
on the floor, largely because the former are far more insulated 
from public view.
Some REINS Act critics argue the reform is unnecessary 
because federal regulatory agencies are already subject to suf-
ficient oversight. Federal agencies are not out of control as dem-
onstrated by studies that conclude that the benefits of federal 
regulations outweigh their costs. This may be so, but it is irrel-
evant. That a government analysis concludes that a given rule is 
net beneficial does not by itself mean that the rule is good policy. 
Regulations commandeer private resources, forcing them to be 
allocated to one purpose or another. Sometimes this is necessary 
or wise, but a simple cost-benefit analysis alone does not dem-
onstrate this fact, nor can such studies show that one regulatory 
approach is superior to available alternatives. We cannot afford 
every net-beneficial idea anymore than the federal government 
or a private firm can afford to make every investment that is 
expected to yield a positive return. Moreover, cost-benefit analyses 
are notoriously manipulable and imprecise, as progressives like 
to remind us, and they cannot account for normative concerns.
If the public believes that more regulations are necessary or 
supports regulatory initiatives of a particular type, requiring a 
resolution of congressional approval will not stand in the way. 
Indeed, it would enhance the legitimacy of those regulations 
Congress approves by making clear that such initiatives com-
mand the support of both the legislative and executive branches. 
If environmental regulation is as popular as environmentalist 
groups claim, then there is really nothing to fear from the REINS 
Act. Even if the legislation allows conservatives in Congress to 
vote down some new major rules — a plausible scenario now 
that Republicans control the House of Representatives — anti-
regulatory members of Congress will suffer for opposing the 
regulatory protections Americans want. The REINS Act forces 
major regulatory decisions onto the floor of Congress and into 
the open, which provides greater popular accountability than 
backroom deal-making or the administrative rulemaking process. 
Above all else, the REINS Act provides a means of enhancing 
political accountability for regulatory policy.
Conclusion
Federal regulation reaches nearly all aspects of modern life and 
is pervasive in the modern economy. Much of this regulation 
may be necessary or advisable, and nothing in the REINS Act 
would hinder a sympathetic Congress from approving new 
federal regulations. In all likelihood, however, the REINS Act’s 
congressional approval process would prevent the implemen-
tation of particularly unpopular or controversial regulatory 
initiatives. The primary effect of the legislation would be to 
make Congress more responsible for federal regulatory activity 
by forcing legislators to voice their opinion on the desirability 
of significant regulatory changes.  
Interested in Education?
Wonder what’s happening in our schools?
Visit the new
www.educationnext.org!
You’ll find:
• Stimulating articles
• Authoritative blogs
• Education news
• Audio & Video
• Searchable archives
CATO_11.25x8.75_8-18-09:Great Books  8/18/09  7:37 AM  Page 1
